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INTRODUCTION

Today Japan is no longer an insignificant king<lom
in a remote corner of East Asia as it used to be known
before the second world war.

Through its consumer goo<ls,

Japan has exported its influence to almost every American
home .

At government's level, the officials arc preoccupied

with the problem of trade imbalance with Japan--the nagging
problem is not on the volume of Japanese imports, but that
the U.S. goods encounter difficulty penetrating the Japanese
market.

The reverse was the situation just before Japan

embarked on massive importation of technologies after the
second world war.

The impressive advancement of Japanese

economy after the war was a combination of the influx of
technologies and the resourcefulness of the Japanese themselves.

The United States has

with Japan.

unfavorable trade relations

This situation is the nucleus of this research.

The second chapter will investigate Japan's economic
growth phase which followed the second world war.

Thi s

growth phase or spurt is commonly known as the "economic
miracle."
The third chapter will elaborate on the presence
of the U. S. large corporations in Japan .

The effect of

such presence on the United States economy will be discussed.

2

The fourth chapter will show Japan moving from the
position of technology importer to the position of technology exporter.
The last chapter is a summary of the U. S. trade
imbalance with Japan since 1971, and an exposition of what
the U. S. officials think are obstacles to improved trade
relations with Japan.
by the U.S.

if

Possibilities of action to be taken

Japan ignores the warning to open up her

market to U.S. products will be thoroughly discussed.

3

CHAPTER II

U. S . LEADERSHIP ROLE
One hundred years ago, Japan was an insignificant
kingdom located in a remote corner of East Asia.

It was of

little interest to those concerned with global, political,
or economic affairs.
all:

But today Japan has changed most of

it is one of the major industrial powers of the world. 1

The size of its gross national product exceeds that of all
other countries except the Soviet Union and the United States.
Japan leads the world in shipbuilding, and is second in steel
production.

Japanese goods of high and sophisticated value--

added content---automobiles , cameras, computers, etc.-- - are
consumed in large quantities throughout the world .

In fact,

today the Japanese are considered serious competitors at nearly
all levels and types of economic activity.
The economic transformation of Japan has been the
most celebrated aspect of its modern history .

This trans-

formation can be conceived in terms of a series of growth
phases or developmental "waves" consis ting of a spurt and
followed by a period of less rapid growth.

The greatest

growth spurt began after its destruction caused by World War
1 Ohkawa, K. ,

University Press,

Ja~anese Economic Growth.
p.
•

Stanford

4

II and the ensuing years of reconstruction and rehabilitation.2

Frequently this spurt has been called Japan's

"economic miracle , " which started in 1952-54 and may be
ending in the early 1970 ' s. 3
llowevc r, there were earl j er spurts and ea rU er waves
of growth.

During the 1930 ' s the Japanese economy developed

at a most impressive pace , which was abruptly interrupted by
the events leading to World War II . 4 Similarly, the years
between the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and the end
of World War I (1918) witnessed very rapid development.
These spurts illustrate a similar developmental pattern:
growth based on the ever more speedy absorption of modern
Western technology.

Othe r factors have also contributed to

Japan's economic growth.
Broadly speaking, Japanese economic development
since 1945 has been dominated by three main influences .
first , came the effects of direct dislocation of e c onomic
activity, including large-scale capital destruction,
4
associated with defeat inflicted by the Allies.
This
resulted in a period of conversion , recovery, and rehabilitation frequently assumed to have ended in 1952-54.

2

Ibid . , p.

3 Ibid., p.
4 Ibid . , p.

3•

3.

4.

5

A second influence relates to longer-lasting consequences of
the war, particularly those associated with Japan's technological isolation between the late 1930's and early 1950's.
A third category is rather vaguely called "new e lements intro-

duced into the Japanese economy by war and defeat ."
War Dislocation and Rehabilitation:
Japan suffered total defeat in 1945, 6 leaving the
national economy in great disorder.

Between 1945 and 1952-54,

Japan's economy was most heavily influenced by reconstruction
and rehabilitation.

During these years abnormal growth

factors outweighed the normal.

This situation changed after

1952-54, although some consequences of the defeat in World War
II and its aftermath are still present.

The 1939 prewar

peak level of GNP was for the first time surpassed in 1954,
and the same is true for GNP per capita.

The aggregate capi-

tal-output ratio also rose to more usual values in 1953,
indicating the end of a period in which previously existing
excess capacity played a major role.

Furthermore, the

occupation ended in 1952 and Japan began once more to run its
own affairs, both as a nation and as an economy.
the postwar growth rate are clear:

Movements of

a decline from the very

high l evels of the early postwar years reaching a turning
point neat 1954;
6

rbid . , p .

after that the rate of growth accelerates.

20.

6

The interpretation of this is that the high rates of the
immediate afterwar years were heavily influenced by recovery
factors that tended to fade away in the middle 1950 1 s.

The

subsequent growth spurt must therefore be attributed to

11

new"

factors having an existence relatively independent of direct
war dislocati.on.
Postwar Technology Imports:
Japan's postwar economic expansion was essentially
spurred by its efforts to catch up with the West in the
industrial arts.
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All Japanese firms' purchases of foreign know-how
require government approval under the Foreign Investment Law~
and the remittances of royalties and fees are subject to the
foreign exchange regulations .
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was
enacted in 1949 for the purpose of regulating the use of
foreign exchange reserves that were in short supply in the
early postwar perjod.

Under this law, all the external

transactions involving remittances in foreign currency arc to
be approved by the government .

On the other hand, the

Foreign Investment Law--formally, the Law Concerning Foreign
Investment--legislated in 1950 was intended to promote an
inflow of foreign capital and technology in order to develop
the Japanese economy and to improve its international payments position.

The Foreign Investment Law takes a positive

approach to enhance the economy ' s capncity to earn foreign
exchange by fostering both import-competing and export industries at home.

The phase providing for remittances arising

from foreign investment relates to the government's intention to provide a full guarantee of the repatriation of
earnings once the investment project is approved . Although
the fundamental objective of the Law was to build up domestic
8 ozawa . T. , Japan's Technological Challenge to the West.
Cambridge : M.I .T. Press, p. 16.

8

industries with the help of foreign capital and technology,
but without being dominated by foreign interests.

For

instance , this attitude was reflected in a speech made by the
then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in New York City in 1960. 9
"As to the first point of assuring transfer, our
dollar position does not allow us to serve every Torn

)

Dick '

and Harry and let them exchange their yen earnings and take
dollars home.

We arc bound to be selective jn th1s respect.

Of course, everybody is welcomed in so far as he does not
demand a prior commitment of the government for transfer.
It is, however, much more advisable that he tells the government beforehand about his investment and sees how much the
government guarantees to transfer out of the profit.
The rate of the transfer will be different according
to the merit of the proposed investment.

When the

Government commits itself to a certain amount of transfer,
the Government is legally obligated to incorporate the
commitment in its running dollar budget .
no default.

The checking system is by no means intended to

create red tape .
rower

Then there will be

It is a device of a poor but honest bor-

who docs not want to cheat creditors .

The related

law clearly states that these checkings and restrictions will
be removed one by one as our dollar position warrants the

removal . "
9

rbid., p.

17

9

As Ikeda p r omised , the government did gradually
reduce i t s restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital
and techno l ogy as well as the remittance of profits as
Japan's foreign reserve position improved.
Japan's imports of technology over the period of
1950-1971 are shown in Figure 2.

The numbers represent

a complete enumeration of technology purchase contracts
approved in each year under the Foreign Investment Law.
Category ' A' comprises those contracts that have an
effective life of more than one year in foreign currency.
Category B, on the other hand covers those contracts that
call for royalty payments in the Japanese yen or have an
effective life of less than a year .

The latter normally

includes incidental arrangements such as an invitation
of foreign engineers or an acquisition of drawings.

It

could be observed that techno l ogy imports of category 'B'
started to decline in 1968.

This may signal a turning

point in Japan ' s postwar technological progress;

its

technical capacity had substantially advanced to such an
extent that industry became less dependent on incidental
technical assistance from the west.

Nevertheless, the

inflow of Western technology into Japan has not been limited
to this govenmrnt controlled channel of technology, the
education of scientists and engineers in the West, or
simply through the study of foreign technical literature.

10
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The government literature directed the inflow of foreign
technologies by making announcements as to what types of
technology were desired for the economy.

Two lists of such
accouncements made in 1950 and 1959 are shown in Table 1. 11
The first part covered only those technologies that
were essential for introducing new producer goods and
processes in existing industries;

on the other hand, the

second part reflecting Japan's further efforts to move its
industry toward more sophisticated levels of activity was
aimed at fostering new sectors such as jet aircraft and
electronic products and increasing productivity efficiency
with the introduction of assembly lines and automated
processes.
11 Ibid.,

p.

21.

12

Table 1. Announcement of Desired Technological Assistance . Selected
Processes and other Technological Assistance
A. 1950
Textiles
Phannaceuticals
1. Acetate flake and fibers
1. Streptomycin
2. Other synthetic fibers
2 . Chloromycetin
3 . Aureomycin
Chemicals
1. Granul ation of calcium cya.na.mide
Nonelectrical Machinery
and cal cium phosphate fertilizer
1. Continuous welded pipe drawing
2. Synthetic phenol
2 . Continuous wire drawing
3. Vinyl chloride
3 . Continuous spinning machinery
4. Mclamin resins
4. Gyro-compass for marine use
5. Silicon resins
5. Dynamic pressure log for marine
6. Pigments
use
7. Furnance black
6. Welding of ships hulls
Petroleum
1. Lubricants by solvent refining
method
2. Catalytic cracking and cracked
olefin gas
3. Addition agents to lubricants
Ceramic products
1. Furnance bed materials
Metals

1. Soaking pit, reheating furnance and
annealing furnance for steel making
Mining
1 . Coal preparation
B.

Electrical Machinery
l. 1-50 type integrating wall
hour meters
2. Demand meters
3. Monopole type mercury rectifers
4. Pldstic insulated wires and
cables
5. Frequency modulation syst(J!I in
radio communication
6 . Frequency modulation system in
radio communication
7. llyporbolic marine radio navigation system
8 . Microwave vacuum tubes
9. G.T. tubes and H. T. tubes
10 . X-ray tubes of revolving type

1959

Chemicals
Chemical products from natural gas or
petroleum gas
Metals
Heat-proof alloys and steel

Electrical Machinery Industry
Electronics
Aircraft
Jct aircraft (including engines
and engine accessories)

Industries in General
Techniques making processes continous, more efficient or automated
Sources: The 1950 l ist adopted from Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, ~he Announcement of Desired Technological ~osistance
(Tokyo: 1950); and tho 1959 list from OECD , Liberalization of International
Capital Movements-Japan (Paris 1968), pp . 49- SO .
Nonelectrical Machi nery
Highly efficient machine tools
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With relaxation of controls in 1959 , the scope of
appro val was extended to allow the acquisition of less
significant tech nologies.

In 1960 there was a shift from

the so-ca ll ed " positive" to a "negative" screening standard.
Under the new system , technology purchase contracts were
approved so long as they were judged not to cause any
detrimental effects on the economy previously they were
approved only on the basis of their "positive" contributions
to the economy .
When Japan became an Article 8 country of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a member of Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Devel opment (OECD) in 1964
restrictions were further lifted, and approval procedures

were simplified .
It was not until 1 968, however, that a full scale of
technology import liberalization took place .

In that year,

all technology purchase contracts with compensation less
than $50 , 000 in each case began to be approved automatically
by the Bank of Japan .

The exceptions are aircraft, weapons ,

explosives, nuclear energy, space exploration computers and
petrochemicals . 12 Tab l e 2 depicts the liberalization taken
by the government.

12

Ibid . , p.

22.
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Table 2. Economic Growth Rate, International Reserves, and Technolo~ Im~rts (Cate20~ A) , 1950-1970
GNP
International
Technology
b
Growth rate
official reserves
Imports
(real) a
(millions of dollars)
(category 1\) a
1950
564
27
1951
924
101
13.0
1952
979
142
7.9
823
1953
102
2 .3
738
1954
82
11.4
1955
768
71
6.8
1956
941
143
8.3
524
1957
118
5.7
861
1958
90
11. 7
1,322
1959
153
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

13.3
14.4
5.7
12.8
10 . 4
5.4
13.1
13. 7
12.6

1,824
1,486
l, 841
1,878
1,999
2,107
2 , 074
2 , 005
2 , 891
3,496

327
320
328
564
500
472
601
638
1,061
1 , 154

1970

10.3

4,399

1,330

14.4

Sources: GNP growth rate and international official reserves are fran
the Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (Tokyo: The Bank of
Japan , 1967 and 1972); and technology imports from Japanese Science
and Technology Agency, 1970- Gaikoku Dohnyu Nenji Honkoku (1970-Annual
Report on Absorption of Foreign Technology) (Tokyo: Printing Office,
The Ministry of Finance, 1972).
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When the government-controlled import program of technology was
initiated in 1950, there were favorable supply conditions - the boom
touched off by the Korean War.

Most Western firms were willing to

supply technology primarily through licensing .

There were, nevertheless,

some firms that were reluctant to license their technologies because of
the fear of nurturing future cOm~etition.
Japan as a buyer

One of the factors favoring

was the availability of alternative

sources of tech-

nology supply.

The nationalities of suppliers of technology (category
13
A) to Japan are shown in Table 3.
su,e21i of Technology bl Country: (1950-1970)
1960-70
Total •·
1950-1959
Number
Number
Countr;t:
. . Number
4,144
United States
665
64.6
56.8 4,809
Table 3.

'

'

'57 . 8

Canada

24

2.3

155

1.6

139

1. 7

United Kingdom

34

3.3

589

8.1

623

7.5

West Germany

71

6.9

930

12.7

1, 001

12.0

France

34

3.3

318

4.4

352

4.2

Switzerland

81

7.9

439

6.0

520

6.2

Italy

25

2.4

124

1. 7

149

1.8

Holland

31

3.0

187

2.6

218

2.6

Belgium

1

0.1

43

0.6

44

0.5

Denmark

6

0.6

51

0.7

57

0.7

Sweden

21

2.0

90

1.2

111

1.3

Australia

2

0.2

27

0.4

30

0.4

Soviet Union

0

0

18

0.3

18

0.2

Other
34
3.3
220
3,0
253
3. 0
Total
1,029
100.0
7,295
100.00 8,324
100.0
source: Japanese science and Technology Agency , 1970-Gijutsu Dohnyu
Nenji Hohkoku (1Y70-Annual Report on Absorption of Foreign Technology)
Tokyo: Printing O£fice, The Ministry of Finance, 1972).
13 Ozawa, T. ~ • P. 24
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The United States is a major supplier, accounting for
as much as 57 . 8 percent of the total contracts concluded
during the period of 1950-1970, although there was a
decline in the U. S. share in the 1960's compared with the
1950 1 s - an indication of a narrowing technology gap
between the United States and the rest of the world. 13

In

fact , the U.S . share is somewhat greater since tho suppliers

in such countries as Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Panama
include many U. S . subsidiaries.

Inspit e of the criticisms

from Britain and Germany, the U.S . continued the export
technologies to Japan .

At that time the U.S. exports are,

on the whole , geared to high and expanding levels of income,
and the U. S . is less dependent on foreign sources of supply
that might be cut off by industrialization abroad.
Equally important is the fact that there is much
stronger interfirm competition in the United States for
improving existing products and markets new ones than in
any other Western country.

I f existing techno1 ogy is doomed

to have a short life expectancy, there is an added incentive
to sell it to those who can make the best use of it and,
hence, can pay the largest possible amount of royalties.
regard, aggressive Japa nese firms have proved to the best
users of U.S . technologies .

13 Ibid. , p .

24 .

In
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Beside economic considerations, other factors that
led the U.S. into exporting technologies to Japan could
be seen from the Asia politics of 1945.
The idea of emancipating the Asian peoples from
European colonialism is one of the three distinguishing
features of Japanese "fascism".

Japan's Asian policy had

been a combination of anti-westernisn and expansjonism.
But Japan was not able to intervene directly against the
European imperialist system until the late 1930's.

Its

goal was popular in Rangoon, Bangkok, Djakorta, and Hanoi.
Japan sought to establish both military and economic ties
in a union called "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere",
a grandiose scheme designed to remove East and Southeast
Asia f1om U.S. - European colonial control . 14 In the
Philippines, Japan had a tradition of deep anti-Americanism
to build on, and the support of some of the leaders of the
original revolutionary uprising, particularly Emilio
Aguinaldo and Artemio Ricarte, who returned to Manila from
Japan.

The Japanese did not plan to invade the whole of

India at any stage of the Pacific war;

rather they hoped

to win over the large number of Indians in Southeast Asia.
build up an anti-British army of Indians in Southeast Asia,
and stimulate the internal breakdown of British rule.

14 Holliday, Jon. A Political History of Japanese
Capitalism. Pantheon Books, New York. p. 146.

18
American strategy was more complex.
two leading allies in Asia;
and the Kuom i ntang.

America had

its colony, the Philippines

The United States was well 1warc of

the dangers of getting embroiled in a land war in China.
American st r ategy , therefore, was cautiously to approach
Japan from the Pacific Islands, avoiding land fighting .

In

many ways, America ' s political aim and the harsh realities
were in conflict .

The prospect of a strong Chinese communist

movement , and a Soviet presence in China left little room
for

a

China that could be America's main Asian ally .

Atten-

tion naturally swung to the possibility of Japan returning
to its place in the world imperialist camp.

The option was

argued for vigorously by Under Secretary of State( and former

Ambassador in Toyko) Joseph Grew, who held that a Japan
somehow purged of its 'militarists ' could become the
United States number one ally in Asia;

indeed, America, he

argued , had a greater indentity of interests and outlook with
15

Japan than it did with Germany .
At the end of the war the U. S. demonstrated its
interests in Japan by massively transferring technological
The U. S. played no small role in making other

know-how.

Western countries appreciate " the wisuom of selling know-how
to .Japan.

16

151bid. , p . 154 .

16Ozawa., p .. 25 •

19

CHAPTER III
FROM LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP
There seems to be a prevailing view that technology
outflows to Japan will inevitably lead to the erosion of
U.S . trade competitiveness .

As is acceptable that Japanese

exports have been substantially supported by imported
technology and that many U.S . manufacturers were , as a
result, exposed to serious competition from Japan.
From Table 4, United States corporations arc the
largest group of investo r s operating in Japan, accounting
for 84 percent of the to t al as of September 1971 .

Of

the 200 largest U. S. corporations, 92 (46%) had already
made an advance into Japanese industry.

United States

based world enterprises are concentrated in such industries
as food processing, electrical machinery, petroleum, chemicals , nonelectrical machinery, transport equipment, and
pharmaceuticals.
With heavy multinational corporation investment, Japan
faced a new challenge of how to cope with much deeper
penetration by foreign interests .

Japanese industries had

already undergone a rapid reorganization through mergers
and acquisition to gain economies of scale and thereby
strengthen their competitive position.

Indeed, thos e firms

which had been previously broken up during the occupation
years have gradually been combined .

Notable examples were

the merge r s of Shin Mitsubshi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi

20
Table 4 Advances of Foreign

Enterprises in Japan (as of

June , 1971)
The number
of the largest
200

Industry
Food Processing

u.s .

corporations
36

(The number of those
with ownership
interest greater
than 20\)
(13)

Textiles

5

1)

Paper and Pulp

9

3)

Chemicals

16

(10)

Petroleum

21

(11)

Rubber and Tire

5

4)

Stone, clay and glass

3

3)

Metals, ferrous and nonferrous

17

5)

Metal products

11

2)

Nonelectric machinery

19

(11)

Electric machinery

19

(10)

Transport equipment

23

( 9)

Precision equipment

4

2)

Others

4

1)

I

(92)
200
Total
Source: Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
Gaishike , Kigyo no Dohkoh (Trend of Foreign Affiliated Enterprises)

21
Nihon Heavy Industries.

17

The Fuji Iron and Steel Co . was significant because
Yawata was the largest s teel company in Japan and also the
fourth largest in the world.

As a result, huge and powerful

Japanese corporations emerged one after another .

In 1957,

among the world's 100 largest corporations, four were Japanese;

the number increased to 14 in 1963 and to 21 in 1972.

18

The competi tjve strength of Japanese firms should not be
judged in terms of their individual size.

There are close

associations among the firms comprising each Keiretsu group .
Since the Keiretsu group embraces a number of heterogenous,
but mutually complementary industries, it enjoys an extremely
flexible form of conglomeration.

The Japanese government is

also bent on encouragin g the development of indigenous technol-

ogy to reduce the dependence of Japanese firms on W~stcrn
technologies.

Tax credit is provided for Research an<l

Develop-(R&D) expenses and for earnings from technology sales
overseas .

R&D expenditures in Japanese industry increases at

a much faster rate than in any other country in the period
1961-1970;

they increased at an average annual rate of

20.6% jn Japan, in contrast to 17.5% in the United States.

18

Industries such as motorcycles, watches, radio and TV
receivers, steel, musical instruments and textiles where the
Japanese had succeeded in developing sufficiend competitiveness, were opened up for direct foreign investment in the
1 7 Tb id . , p . 4 4 .
18 Ibld., p . 60 .
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early stages of liberalization.
category 'A ' .

These were classified as

Those industries which were considered vulner-

able to foreign domination were classifled as category 'B',
restricted foreign entrants, permitting foreign ownership up
to 50%.
Japan is among the few industrialized countries belonging to the same classification as the United States , France ,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Canada, Belgium, and Norway were classified as "medium R&D
oriented", while Austria and Italy are non-R&D oriented.
In the years in which the findings were based, Japan
ranked fifth among twelve O.E.C.D. countries in total R&D
activities.

This is remarkable because Japan had the lowest

percentage of "scientific and technical personnel" in the
total force as compared with nine other industrial countries .
Thus Japan's R&D activities were highly.intensive in their
use of scientific and technical human resources .
The large trade surplus which the United States enjoyed
throughout the post war period began to dwindle in the late
1960's .

In 1971 a merchandise trade deficit

of $2 . 7 billion

was recorded for the first time in the postwar period - in
fact it was the first trade deficit

since 1888 .

20

The def-

icit was still greater in 1972 , reaching $6.8 billion.

The

sudden erosion of U.S. trade competitiveness in recent years
is often attributed in part, if not entirely, to the spread
of U. S . technology to Europe and Japan through
ZOibid., p .

111.

Table 5.

Country

Japan

Indicators of R&D Efforts in Industrialized OECD Hernber Countries in 1963-1964
GERO/
QSAE
R&D
GNP
engaged in R&D
perfonned
GERO
at
(Fulltime e~ivlen~s in the
GERO
per
market
per 10,000
business
of
(Millons oapita
prices
sector
of_u,s.> ($ U.S.) (\)
Number Population
(\)
1964
1,060
197,225
10.9
1.4
20.3
64 . 6

United States

1963-64

France

Company
funds
(\)

64 . 3

21,075

110.5

3.4

696,500

35.8

66.4

32.0

1964

1,650

34.1

1.9

95,574

19.7

49.5

33.l

Germany

1964

1,436

24.6

1.4

105,010

18.0

65.9

56.5

Italy

1963

291

5.7

0.6

30,280

6.0

62.6

61.5

United Kingdon

1964-65

2,160

39.8

2.3

159,538

29.4

67.3

40.3

Austria

1963

23

3.2

0.3

3 ,200

4.5

63.5

53.8

Belgium

1963

137

14 . 7

1.0

15,600

16.8

69.0

64.4

Canada

1963

425

22.5

1.1

23,850

12 . 6

41.3

33.5

Netherlands

1964

330

27 . 2

1.9

31,310

25.8

55.5

51.4

Norway

1963

42

11.5

0 .7

3,820

10 . 4

51.7

37 .o

21.6

65.6

47.7

Sweden
Source:

257
33.5
1.5
16,530
1964
OECD Gaes in TechnoloSY Analitical Re~rt (Paris 1970).
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the worldwide operations of multinational U.S. corporations .
As has been shown earlier , Japan has been a most fortunate beneficiary of international transfers of industrial
know -how in the postwar period .

A study made by Michael

Boretsky , a U. S . Department of Commerce senior policy analyst
whose work has been frequently used in official tr ade policy
analys i s , shows that although the United States enjoys an
overall trade surplus i n high-technology products s uch as
chemicals, machi nery , e lectronics , autos, aircraft, and
scientific instruments , its trade balance with Japan even in
this category of products is a principal cause of the post- .
20
war deterioration of the U.S . trade balance .
In view of this ~cent development, some Americans, particularly those with a strong protectionist sentiment, are
likely to reason that since the technology which the Unites
States has given the Japanese has greatly fostered Japanese
competitiveness , it is high time that the United States
restricted such self-destructive practice.

Technology's role

as a major determinant of the vitality of the U.S. economy
was brought to the national consciousness in 1972 when
President Nixon sent congress the first Presidential message
on Science and technology, in which he emphasized improving
productivity, reg aining U.S. technological leadership, and
restoring a favorable trade balance through an Experimantal
Techno l ogy Incentive Program (ETIP).
20 Ibid., p .

111.
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The message generated a host of proposals aimed at creating
a favorable environment of R&D efforts , including tax
incentives and the relaxation of antitrust regulations .

The

enthusiam thus engendered , however, has withered as key administrative officials interested in the technology efforts
have l eft the Administration and the budget cuts have forced
the contraction of many of the original plans.

But there

are other reasons for the technology efforts failure to
catch the imagination of the American public .

Americans

have begun to take a skeptical view of the benefits of
Science and Technology, particularly for industrial progress.
Antiwar sentiment developed during the Vietnam war partly
responsible for this trend.

Technolo g ical progress had,

after all , made possible the napalm, defoliation agents, and
nerve gas.

Increasing awareness of environmental problems

was another factor.

Modern industrial technology has often

been identidied as the villain responsible for ecological
disrup ti on and decay in the quality of life .

The business

sector appears to be losing interest in R&D programs in
general and in the development of the new products and
processes in particular.

According to a survey made by the
21
McGraw Jlill Economics department in 1973,
the R&D efforts
of U. S . firms will increasingly be aimed at improving exist ing products and processes rather than

21 Hal l, Robert. ~J~a~p~a=n~·~--~I~n~d~u~s_t_r_i_a_l__
Po_w_e_r_o_f_A_s_1_·a_.
Nostrand Company , New York. p. 112.
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finding new ones.

The 1973 survey also indicates that U. S.

firms expect to perform $21.2 billion worth of research and
development.

The total represents 2 . 4 percent of industry

sales in 1973, a slight decline from the 2.5 percent in 1972.
An

even further decline is expected by 1976.

The survey

points out moreover that industry expects only 13 percent of
itssalcs to come from new products in 1976,compared with 18
percent that it predicted for

1975 in the 1972 survey .

The ever-rising costs of research in the development of
new products, as well as its risks, are cited by the McGrawllil 1 study as a factor in the recent tendency of U.S. firms
t9 opt for research projects that pay off quickly and that

are directed to current marketing and manufacturing requirements rather than venturing on new products.
Another factor seems to be the result of the experience
of the United States as the postwar technolocical leader in
the world market.

As noted earlier, the United States has

introduced a variety of ~ew products - first to consumers at
home and then to the rest of the world.

As the technology

gap narrowed , however, the United States began to lose its
competitiveness on R&D-based exports.

Whatever new products

were introduced first in the United States came to be
quickly imitated by overseas competitors thus, confronted
with the costliness and futility of continuing to introduce
new products i n an ever-competitive trade environment, many
U.S . firms appear to be turning to the defense of existing
products .
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CHAPTER IV
JAPAN EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY
It is often observed that Japan's postwar industrial
expansion has been more strongly oriented to domestic than
to foreign markets .

Usually presented as evidence for this

view is a relatively small ratio of Japan's export to GNP .
Indeed the assertion that the domestic market, rather than
exports , was the primary basis for economic growth is paradoxical for a small island economy which depends so much on
overseas market for industrial resources and whose eAport
drive ls so famed .

A look at Tables 6

& 7 shows that the

domestic market absorbs 80 to 90 percent of each industry's
licensed output during the period 1950-1960, with the exception of the textile industry.

22

Yet, the ratio of the ex-

ports was considerably significant.

These ratios for elec-

trical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemicals and
Iron and Steel , for example , steadily climb to the range of
25 to 50 percent toward the end of of the 1950 ' s .

23

Thus

the exports of those products manufactured with imported
technology , though i nitially insignificant, swiftly increased
and came to account for a sizeable proportion of each industry's total exports .

In fact as much as 50 percent of Ja-

pan ' s e xports of electrical machinery in 1960 involved those
products manufactured under licenses.

22 ohkawa, p . 46.
23 Ozawa, p . ~1
" .

2f1

TABLE 6. Sales distribution of licensed manufactures between export
and domestic markets 1950-1960 (in eercentage)
1950 1951 '52 , '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 ' '59 ' 60
Industry
A
93 . 1 91.3 88.l 97.6 97 .6 98.2 98.3 96.2 95.2 92.3 89.9
Electrical
B
6.9
Machinery
8.7 1.9 2.4 2 . 4 1.8 1.7 3.8 4.8 7.7 10.l

--

Nonelectrical
Machinery

A

B

98. 5 99.2 96.4 96.3 90.8 91.7 90.9 90.7 93 .7 94.3
1.5 0 . 8 3.6 3.7 9.2 8 . 3 9.1 9.3 6 . 3 5.7

Chemicals

A

99. 1 98. 9 95.9 90.5 82 .l 82.9 83.0 82 .0 80 . 7 85 . 8

:-

B

Iron and Steel

94.9 95 .7 92.3 82 . 7 85 . 4 89 . 5 84.5 85.4 84.8 86.0
5 .1 4.3 7.7 17.3 14.6 10.5 15.5 14 .6 15 . 2 14.0

A

B

Transport
Equipment

9 2 .4 94 .7 98.6 99 .7 94.7 96.4 97.8 95.8 97.1 94 . 6

'A
B

7.6

5.3

1.4

0.3

5.3

3.6

2.2

4.2

2.9

5.4

33 . 4 34.1 40.7 31.3 42 .2 43.4 40.9 112.2 43 . 4
66.6 65.9 59.3 68.7 57.8 56.6 59 . 1 57.8 56.6
Source. Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry Gaikoku
Gijutsu Dohnyu no Genjoh to Mondaten (CW:rent Status and Problems Foreign
Technology/Absorption) Tokyo:M.ITI, 1962.
Textiles

'A
B

Table 7. Sales of Licensed Manufactures in Total Value of Exports by
Industry, 1950-1960 (in percenta51:e)
1950 '51 '52 '53 ' 54 '55 ' 56 ' 57 '58 '59 '60
Industry
Electrical
11.7 6 . 3 31.2 24.4 28.2 17 . 3 29 . 1 44.5 43.8 50.2
6.8
Machinery
Nonelectrical
Machinery

0.3

0.9

4.9

1.9

6.2

7.6

11.9 14 . 8 9.1

Chemicals

0.05 0.2

1. 3

2.8

7.6

8.6

10. 2 15 .7 25.2 24.3

Iron and Steel

0.3

0.3

3.8

10.3 7.9

10.7 22.0 22 . 9 39.0 35.6

Transport
Equipment

0.1

0.2

O.l

o.J.

0.6

1.2

0 .4

8.8

LO 0.7 1.5

1.1 3.1 2 . 7 4.8 4.0 4.8 6.0 6.1 6 . 0
Textiles
Source. Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Gaikoki
Gijutsu Donny no Genjoh to Momdajten (Current Status and Problems of
Foreign Technology Absorption)
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Chemicals and Iron and Steel also exhibited similarly high
percentages of such exports .

Although the corresponding

ratio of transport equipment was small, a large part of this
industry's inputs, such as steel and machinery for ships and
automobiles , came from other industries which were producing
under licenses. In fact if all the input-output relationships
among industries are taken into account , the contribution of
licensed manufacturers to Japan's export performance would be
much greater than implied by the ratios.

The corresponding

ratjo for textiles was, nevertheless, extremely small.

Foreign

technologies acquired by this industry were mostly related to
the production of new synthetic fibers, but Japan's export
of such product~ remained relatively small during the 1950's
since cotton textiles were still the industry's major export
item.
In earlier chapters it was shown that Japan adopted and
in many instances perfected imported technology for profitable commercial uses.

In the process they introduced many

improvements into imported technology and created new
discoveries and breakthroughs by their own original research.
As a result the Japanese themselves soon came to export techIndeed, technology exports have been expand24 Total
ing at a much faster rate than commodity exports.
$72
receipts from technology exports in 1971 amounted to
24 The trend of Japan's technology is shown in Table 8.
million.
nical know-how .

24 Ibid., p. 85.
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Table 8.

Japan's Export of Technology-number of agreements, 1950-1971
1950 '55 ' 60
'65
to
to
to
to
1954 '59 ' 64
' 68
' 69
'70
' 71

Electrical
machinery

7

21

68

83

78

219

254

Transport
equipment

2

3

7

23

43

46

58

11\achinery

2

9

19

45

20

50

57

Mining, metallurgy
and metals

3

8

22

44

52

131

155

Chemicals

6

15

86

180

143

255

267

Textiles

1

4

9

2

2

13

25

Store, Clay
and glass

2

4

3

14

17

8

26

Food processing

1

4

10

9

9

51

62

Others

4

21

49

12

41

88

108

Nonelectrical

Total
27
89
273
412
405
861
1012
Sources. The 1950-1971 data came from Japanese Science and Technology
Agency , Wagakuni Gijutsuyushutsu no Genjo.

Secured from this program however, may undere~tirnate the volume of
current technology expo~ts, since it normally takes a few years before
exported technology is profitable exploited in foreign markets and
starts to bring home royalities.
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The number of technology transfers equal the number of
contr act s i nvolving the sale of technology .

In the early

1950 's the technology outflow was a trickle; it gathered
momentum in the 1960 1 s and turned into a sizeable flow with
the advent of the 1970 ' s .

In contrast to technology-purchase

contracts , which are subject to official screening , no government controls exist over the overseas sale of industrial
technology by Japanese firms.

Under the tax credit program

a technology exporting firm can deduct from its taxable cor-

porate profits 70 percent of the income earned from technology exports . 25

The information secured from this program,

however , may underestimate the volume of current technology
ls profitably expoited in foreign markets and starts to bring
home royalties .

Other sources of official data are question-

naires and newspaper accounts .

For example , the Science and

Technology Agency collected data for the period of 1950- 1963
26
by questionnaire in 1964 .
Since then , they have been collecting reported cases in the newspapers with followup confirmations with the firms involved.

Although the significant

technology sales are likely to be reported in ma jor newspapers , the statistics thus gathered are inevitably incomplete.
Aside from the recent surge in Japan's technology exports,
changes in the countries to which technologies are sold manifest a rapid level of industrial arts of Japan.
2 5Ibid. , pp . 85- 86 .

26 rbid • .,

p . 86.
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Thus Japan's technologies, initially exported mostly to l ess
developed Asian countries, are now being exported to the
27
United States.
Japan is now finding more and more that the
United States is an important customer for its t echnology.
Predictably, research-intensive industries, such as electrical
and electronics machinery, chemicals, and transport equipment
are particularly active in selling technologies overseas.
These industries have invested a great deal in research
activity and have succeeded in establishing themselves as
Japan's leading export industries.

But many firms in these

industries were, until very recently, unwilling to share
technical knowledge except with closely affiliated firms at
home.

Lately, these firms have changed attitude toward the

export of technology.

Rather than jealously guarding their

patents and know-how from foreign competitors, they now actively
promote overseas sales 0£ industrial knowledge .

Their rapid

accumulati on of patents and know-how is no doubt the fundamental reason for their willingness to expo rt technology.

Yet

the decisive turning point came with their realization that
their commodity expo rt drive could no longer be pursued in the
face of Japan's huge trade surplus and rising protectionism
sentiment .

As an alternative, the Japanese opted for export-

ing technology, particularly in connection with andin support
of their overseas direct investments.

This strategy is

popularly known in Japanese industry as a switch from hard to
27

Ibid., p.

87
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soft exports .

According to a survey made by the Japanese

Science and Technology Agency in 1970, 2 8 some 34 percent of
the respondents indicated that technology exports facilitated
closer business relationships; 26 . 5 percent said technology
exports were instrumental in increasing their manufactured
exports; and 17 percent stated that technology exports were
preferable substitutes for commodity exports, since the export
of technology often entails the export of plant equipment,
parts, and components.
The United States which has recently purchased Japan's
most recent industrial know-how, mostly under licensing agreements, is finding that new supplies of technology are often
tied to Japan's manufacturing investments.

It is Japan's

turn to combine technology with direct foreign investments in
western sountries.

Yet there is an important difference

between Japan's technology - cum - investment strategy and
that of its U. S. counterpart.

The U.S. firms had to use the

supp ly of technology as leverage to acquire equity participation because of the Japanese government's restrictions on
foreign corporate ownership.

In contrast, the U. S . provides

a very favorable investment climate; the Japanese arc
practically free to establish wholly-Japanese owned subsidiar- ,
ies.

In fact, such investments are welcomed in the United

States as a plus factor for its b3lance of payments and

28

Ibid., p. 92.
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employment - many states are, indeed, sending missions to
Japan to attract investments.

Because they meet with high

wage rates an<l less tractable labor unions in the Unites
States , Japanese firms can set up profitably only those manufactures which produce either high technology, high-value
products or uniquely Japanese products of highly-automated but
relatively small scales of production.
former are Sony Corporation's color

Some examples of the

TV assembly plant in

San Diego, CA; Hitachi's magnet plant in Edmore, MI; Mitsubishis synthetic-leather factory in Moonachie, New Jersey.

The

investments in typically Japanese products are examplified
by Kikkoman's soy-sauce factory in Walworth, WI, and Missin's
29
manufacturing of instant noodles in Los Angeles.
These
ventures arc designed both to avoid mounting resistance

to

Japanese imports and to serve directly U.S. markets which might
otherwise

be cut off by protectionist measures.

Thus by way ofindrrect investments Japanese firms are
aiming at retaining, and wherever possible, expanding the
markets they have already secured through exports.

Many

Japanese firms have already made substantial inroads into
U.S . markets, enjoy well established distribution channels
through which they can readily market locally produced
products.

In this regard, the Japanese are considered

to be

in quite a fortunate position compared with U.S. manufacturers
interested in operatjng in Japan . In addition, the Japanese
29 Ibid., p. 95 .
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government is encouraging the overseas investment of Japanese
firms by legislating favorable tax measures (such as an
increase from 10% to 30% in the amount of tax deductible loss
reserves for investments in advanced countries); furthermore,
the revaluation of the yen provided still another financial
incentive for overseas ventures since

Japanese fjrms were

able to invest an appreciated currency .
On the other hand, those Japanese manufacturers who have
been successful in exporting s tandardized and relatively
low-technology products , notably electric machinery and
appliances , are seeing their price competitiveness eroded by
the appreciation of the yen and by rising wages at home. Since
labor costs are a major competitive determinant, these manufactures are setting up shops in neighboring Asian countries,
from which they intend to export to the United States.
Although the migration of labor-intensive industries from
Japan to other Asian countries was already in the making
around 1968, 30 the trend has been intensified after t h e
successive devaluations of the dollar; Japanese manufacturers
found it increasingly difficult to absorb the higher costs
caused by these devaluations.

Thus they are trying to retain

control over their established markets in the United States
by resorting to what may be cal led a circular export strategy;
that is, to produce in, and export from, low-wage third
countries.

Japan automobile manufacturers who have quickly

3oibid.·, p. 95 -
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carved out large market shares in the United States are, however, not so fortunate in adopting themselves to the sudden
changes in export environment.

Since their international

competitiveness is derived largely from loyal and highly
efficient workers at home and from the benefits of scale
economics realized from the rapidly grown domestic markets,
they arc groping for ways to cope with decline in their price
competitiveness; they are hesitant to start manufacturing in
the United States, where the supply of assemblyline workers
is unfavorable with respect to both wage and quality; nor are
they willing to transplant their production base to low-wage
developing countries which lack domestic market .

Although

Nissan Motor Co ., the producer of Datsun cars, is experimenting
with the assembly of trucks near Los Angeles and expects to
open another one in Seattle, its scale is still small, and
no such operation is yet specifically planned for passenger
cars.
Prospects for Japanese passenger-car assembly operations
in the United States may, however, improve with two possible
future deve lopments.

First, Japanese automakers will place

greater emphasis on style and engineering exce llence , particularly emission controls and low gasoline con sumption. Rising
aff:hlence at home is also increasing the demand for higher
value cars with fancier styles, more comfort features , and
better performance.

Thus, more sophisticated models necess-

itated partly by the changing taste of the domestic consumers,
and also as a new overseas marketing strategy to avoid a

39

fu rt he r expansion of u nit sales while increasing the dollar
volume of exports , wil l be developed by the Japanese automobile industry .

Such an increase in the value-added of

their cars is exactly what is needed not only to keep up with
rising wage rates at home but also to make their direct
operatjons in the United States economically fcasihle.

The

second favorable development may come from labor-saving
technological progr ess in automobile production .

Japan's

industrial system is a t present highly conducive to automation because of the job security traditionally guaranteed to
workers under the custon of lifetime employment ; coupled with
the current abundance of employment opportunities and workers'
growing disposition of leisure.

It may be of no surprise to

find that highly automated methods of production arc more
readily and more quickly introduced in Japan from now on than
in the United States .

As the Japanese gain experience with

automated production, t he feasibility of their assembly operations in the United S t ates will no doubt be increased.
I n<lccd, with the development of labor-saving techniques,
the Japanese may even s ucceed in building steel mills in the
United States .

The fi r st Japanese-owned steel-producing

plant is already under construction in Auburn , New York.

31

Other steelmaking investments are r eportedly under discussion
between a group of Japanese firms (trading companies and
steel firms) and U. S . scrap dealers .

40

Guaranteed scrap supplies and cheaper land and electric
power are said to be the major attractions for the Japanese
Partners.

Japan's steel industry is; on the whole, prob-

ably the most automated in the world.
to modern innovations is well known.

Its quick adoption
An example is the

export of Nippon Iron and Steel Company's automated system
to Halside.

Another Japanese steel firm, Nippon Kokan K.K.,

has recently sold its automation know-how to Natjonal Steel
Corporation of the United St ates. 31 It is reportedly a
completely automated, continuous type of steel cold-rolling
mill, capable of saving four-fifths of the manpower required
for the conventional types.

It also improves yield and the

uniform quality of products , achieving more than
a SO percent

31
.
.
.
increase
1n
overa11 e ff.1c1ency.

The appli-

cation of these new automation technologies, and possibly
others in the future, will certainly make Japanese steelmaking investments in the United States more feasible
economically

and more competitive.

There is also a unique breed of research-oriented
Japanese companies which are eyeing the U.S . markets not so
much for the direct manufacture of existing products as for
the purpose of cultivating the innovation - conducive
atmosphere of the U. S . markets in order to develop new
products.
31

Ibid . , p .

97 ·
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One such company, already inoperation in the United States,
is Omron R&D Incorporated, Mountain View, California, which
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Omron Tateishi Electronics
Company of Japan.

The subsidiary, set up to tap U.S. research

brain power, employs about 200 American Scientists and Engineers , many of them from firms formally engaged in the U.S .
space program.

Among their products are electronic calcula-

·
·
·
t ors , Co mu
an d 1nstrumentatJon
rccor1crs. 31
P tc r t ape d rives,

According to Masataka Tamura, another Japanese company,
the Nippon Miniature Bearing Company (NMB) is making good use

of the skills and experience of the American engineers and
technicians transferred to them when the company purchased a
run-down plant previously owned by the Los Angeles Divisjon of

SKF Industries, a leading manufacturer of miniature ball
bearings and spherical bearings.

Unable to install the

machinery they intended to ship from Japan because of the
31
Japanese seomen ' s strike in 1971.
NMB was forced to improvise operations using whatever machinery and labor were available in the United States .

They were pleasantly surprised,

however , when they discovered that the engineering experience
and manufacturing skill embodied in the machine-man inter-

actions of the U.S. plant were far more relevant to the U.S.
operations than their Japanese counterparts and that American
machinists and technicians could operate the multifunctional
31 Ibid. ,

p.

97.
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machines a t much higher speed and precision than their
Japanese counterparts .

With some adaptation of Japanese

methods the company also improved the machine operation5,
reducing the rejection rate from 30 percent to less than S
percent .

33

In another bold move the Japanese are putting up textile
mills of their own in the United States , a country that has
long been accustomed to the belief that Japan's competitiveness in textiles derives so lely from its cheap labor.

For

example, Toyobo Company, in its joint venture with Rosewood
Fabrics of the United States is building

a

.
.
l
. 33
an d pr1nt1ng
pant
near Augusta, Georg1a.

$15 million dyeing
Many other najor

Japanese textiles companies are planning similar advances.
Their motives are both resources and market-oriented;easy
access to cotton and a quick monitoring of the changing market.
Trade Deficit
The growing U.S . trade deficit is but one manifestation

of an entirely new phase in the evolution of international
economic relations since World War II.

In addition to other

couses of the trade deficit , the U. S. bilateral trade relations
34
with Japan constituted a deficit of $8 billion in 1977,
and
35 In 1971 the U.S. recorded its first
11 . 6 b illion in 1978.
merchandise trade deficit of $2 . 7 billions since 1888.

36

33 Ibid ., p . 98.
34 cohen Stephen. "The Causes and Consequences of the
U. S . Trade D;fic it in 1978" .
Business Economics May 1978 p. 53.
35Washington (AP) U. S . Finishes 1978 with Record Trade
Deficit of $28 .4 5 billion, January 29, 1979.
36 ozawa ,
P . 111.
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The 2.5 billion increase of the 1977-trarle deficit over the
-4
1976 deficit is attributable to the following reasons:j
(1) The continued success of Japanese producers in
expanding their U.S . market for quality consumer goods
(espec ially electronics and motor vehicles) and some
capital goods (Mainly steel).
(2)Sluggish raw materials exports from the u.s. 34
(3)A continuing inability of the U. S . to sell
manufactured goods in the .Japanese Market ..
(4)The perverse short-term effects of the yen's
appreciation. The U.S. inability to sell manufactured
goods in Japan is no worse than anyone•~This is suggested by the fact that on a multilateral
basis, official Japanese trade statistics show imports
of light and heavy industrial goods during the first seven
months of 1977 were valued at $8.4 billion, far less than
Japanese trade during that same period. Japan's impact on
international industrial production during this time is
further seen in the fact that the seven-month 1977 surplus
on manufactured foods of $35 billion (this is 60 billion of
an annual rate) is up from $28 billion for the comparable
34
1978 pcriod.
Productivity and Inflation
During the most of the 1960's

the U.S . enjoyed rapi<l

economic growth combined with both low unemployment and low
inflation.

But in the 1970's the economy has been plagued

by inadequate expansion, persistent high unemployment
37
nnd galloping inflation.
The labor Department ~et the
rise in consumer prices for all of 1978 at a full 9 percent,
making it the second most inflationary year in the past
34 Ibid., p. 53.
37 tr:"""s." Time Perils of the Productivity Sag, 1979. p. 126.
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three decades.
In 1952 total output in the United States was more
than ten times that in Japan. 38 By 1960 the ratio of the
U.S. to Japanese output had fallen to 7.4 and by 1967 the
ratio had fallen to 4.0

By the end of the period in 1974

this ratio had fallen still further to 3.4 in both countries
growth of total output accelerated between the years 195260 to 3.7 percent for 1960-74 .

For Japan the rate of growth

of output rose from 9.1 percent for 1952-60 to 9.5 percent
for 1960-74.

The quality of capital input in the United

States was more than sixteen times that in Japan at the
39
beginning of the period 1952-74.
By the end of the
period in 1974 this ratio has dropped to 6.0.

Average

annual growth rates of capital input rose modestly from
3.5 percent for the period 1952-60 to 4 . 0 percent for the
period 1960-74. 39 For Japan the annual rates of growth of
captial input are well below corresponding U.S. rates of
growth for the period 1952-60.

Beginning i n 195 7 annual

rates of capital input increased dramatically from an
average of 3.6 percent for the period 1952-60 to 11 . 9 per39
cent for 1960-74 .
Some of the major causes of th e lag in productivity in
the United States are cited below.
38 Jorgenson, Dale and Nishimizu, Mieko . "U.S. and
Japanese economic growth, 1952-1974 . " Economic Journ a l
(December 1978) p. 714.
39 Ibid., p. 719.
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Excess Regulation:

Firms contend that they have to "pour more

and more money into costly antipollution equipment and devote
increasing attention to complying with health and safety rules.
Inadequate Investment:

Between 1948 and 1973 business spending

on new plant and equipment added 3 percent a year to the
capital investment supporting each man-hour of work .

Since

then this capital-labor ratio has increased only 1.75 percent
annually. 40 It is argued whether the chief reason has been tax
policies that favor consumption over investment of business
fear that recession and or inflation will wipe out profit on
new investment .

In either case the result has been to slow

the introduction of cost-cutting, labor-saving machinery
and to slash the growth of productivity by half a percentage
point each year.
Reduced R&D :

In 1964 Research and Development spending

accounted for 3 percent of the gross national product; last
40
year the share was down to 2 . 2 percent.
Chanse in the Work Force:

Since the mid-60 ' s, women

and youths born during the post-war baby have flooded into
the job market. 40 Many lacked the trajning and experience
needed to become highly productive workers in their first
few years.
4O

u. S .

T .i me, p. 127.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

As was envisioned after World War II that Japan, rather
than China, would be a true ally of the United States has been
made a reality .

Today a few noticeable similarities exist

between the economic structure of Japan and that of the United
States.

Trade and exchange of technolo gies between the two

nations arc growing in intensity and complexity.

But these

arc not without some serious disadvantages to the U.S. in
terms of trade relations .
As could be observed from Figure 3, a relatively constant
trade gap in favor of Japan existed until 1975.

After that

year, the trade gap increased from a deficit of $2.4 billion
to a deficit of $5 billion in 1976, and $8 billion in 1977.
41
In 1978 the Deficit topped $12 billion.
26
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41 U. S . Time. Furor Over Japan , November 13, 1978.
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The rising trade deficit has generated a wave of concern
over U.S.-Japan trade relations.

Senator Lloyd M. Bentson ,

D- Texas, accused Japan of effectively "fostering exports while
thwarting access to its markets.

Japanese offers to import

millions of dollars involved in the U.S. trade deficit with
that country , " concluded the senator. 42 Apparently the U.S.
officials are not worrying about Japan ' s bureaucratic trade
policy with the U. S.

According to John Nevin, chairman of

Zenith Corporation; "The question is whether Japan is going
to open up or the rest of world is going to shut down Japan~ 2
Another economist, Otton Eckstein of Data Resources lnc.,
Lexington , Mass. , declared that what is really needed to restore the dollar's health is "quick and dramatic relief from
Japanese imports.

Intrade, the Japanese have done nothing

for us . " 43
The huge trade imbalance not only cost American workers
jobs and help fan U.S. inflation, but have also contributed
to the weakening of the dollar against the yen over the past
few years .
While it is agreed upon 1n principle that those controls
and regulations imposed by Japan on imports generally have
been dismantled , the U. S. goods have not penetrated the
Japanese market as expected .
42 Post Washington Bureau. Sen . Bentsen Criticizes
Japan Trade Policies. December 19, 1978. p. 13.

43~

- , p . 93
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Some obstacles to trade still exist.

A few U. S. businesses

complain that the Japanese language constitutes a harrier.
The Japanese themselves have a common mentality hhich is
against importation of manufactured goods .

According to the

Assistant Commerce Secretary , Frank Weil, there is a "gigantic
Japanese bureaucracy with its bias against foreign manufactured
44
goods'' .
For example, government agencies like the railways
and telegraph an<l telegram systems which spend roughly $52
billion a year , hhve been under orders to "buy national".
When the government docs not want to bu ~ foreign, wholesalers
and industrial buyers steer clear of imports as well. At the
same time , customs officers have been known to effectively
shut out imports by finding fault with documentation.

Moreover,

since there is no reciprocity between Japan and the U.S. on
normal standards, certifications and product health and safety
regulations on foreign imports have to face lengthy and
expensive testing procedures.

44

Until very recently, even the

smallest error gave minor bureaucrats an excuse to order the
whole thing redone.
A further problem U. S . firms face is Japan's multilayered
complex distribution system.

This retail network is dominated

by the wholesale trading houses, which can set the prices of
imported goods so high that they fall Jnto the luxury, low sales category.
44 Post \fashington Bureau.

December 19, 1978. p. 13.
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This line of actlon by the Japanese middlemen could
trigger a countermeasure by the U.S. according to Senator
Lloyd Bentsen , D-Texas, "a surcharge on Japanese imports is
a poss1"b"l"
1 1ty ' . 44

\''h
.
1
et h er a sure h arge or import
quota as

a countermeasure against the trade imbalance with Japan it

will not be without repercussions against the U. S.

To

avoid possibilities, the U.S. concluded an agreement with
Japan last January that pledged Japan to cut tariff walls
and quotas, with the ajm of bringing U. S. - Japanese trade
bock into balance by 1980.

45

44 Post Washington Bureau.

45u.s. Time.

December 19, 1978. p.13,

November 13, 1978. p. 92.
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